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This paper explores the links between business cycles and long-run
growth. Although it is clear from a theoretical point of view that both of
these phenomena are driven by the same macroeconomic variables, the
interaction between economic fluctuations and growth has been largely
ignored in the academic literature. The main reason for this lack of
attention is the surprising stability of long-term growth rates and their
apparent independence from business cycle conditions, at least among
industrial economies. Business cycles in these countries can be charac-
terized as alternating series of recessions followed by recoveries that
bring gross domestic product (GDP) levels to trend; this suggests that
one can study growth and business cycles independently. To illustrate
this point, figure 1 displays real GDP per capita for the U.S. economy
during the period 1870–1999. A simple log-linear trend represents a
highly accurate description of the long-term patterns of per capita out-
put in the United States.1 This pattern is very similar for other indus-
trial countries such as France, Germany, and Great Britain, although
the slope of the trend shows stronger indications of breaks, especially
after the Second World War.
The lack of a widely accepted, empirically valid growth model has
resulted in the use of two distinctive approaches to studying the relation
between growth and business cycles. From an empirical viewpoint, the
(augmented) Solow model seems to fit the cross-country data quite well, as
I would like to thank Norman Loayza, Ilian Mihov, and Luis Servén for useful
comments and suggestions.
1. As Jones (1995a, 1995b) has pointed out, an extrapolation of a log-linear
trend for the pre-1914 period produces extremely accurate point estimates of
current GDP levels.
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Figure 1. U.S. Real per Capita GDP (in logs)
shown in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992, 1995). However, early attempts to empirically validate endogenous
growth models have not been very successful, as argued in Easterly and
others (1993) and Jones (1995b). As a result, no clear framework has been
established for analyzing the impact of business cycles on growth.
Despite such arguments, a growing literature establishes inter-
esting theoretical links and empirical regularities relating growth
and business cycles. Recent analysis of cross-country growth perfor-
mances reveals less support for Solow-type growth models.2 At the
same time, since the work of Nelson and Plosser (1982), it is com-
monly accepted that business cycles are much more persistent than
what is suggested in figure 1. Moreover, the GDP profile of countries
other than the United States is at odds with steady-state models of
economic growth, as suggested by Easterly and Levine (2001). Direct
evidence has also been presented on the effects of business cycles on
variables related to long-term growth. Productivity is affected by the
business cycle and seems to react to events that are supposed to be only
cyclical.3 Growth-related variables, such as investment or research and
2. Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2002); Easterly and Levine (this volume).
3. See, for example, Shea (1999).193 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
development (R&D) expenditures, are procyclical. Finally, features of
the business cycle, such as the volatility or persistence of economic
fluctuations, are correlated with long-term growth rates.4 These em-
pirical regularities are very difficult, or even impossible, to reconcile
with models in which technological progress and long-term growth
are exogenous.
This paper presents an overview of the theoretical arguments, to-
gether with a summary of the evidence of the effects of business cycles on
growth in a large cross section of countries.5 The analysis is undertaken
on two levels. The first part of the paper looks at the connections between
certain characteristics of the business cycle and long-term growth rates
and establishes a set of empirical regularities. These regularities are
well captured by a simple endogenous growth model in which long-term
growth dynamics are central to business cycles. Although this theoreti-
cal framework uncovers interesting connections between long-term growth
and features of the business cycle such as persistence, it does not pro-
duce unambiguous predictions about whether the volatility of economic
fluctuations has negative effects on long-term growth rates.
The second part of the paper directly studies the possibility that
business cycles have a significant effect on long-term growth rates by
looking at asymmetric business cycles as well as considering the gen-
eral effects of uncertainty. Overall, the evidence presented suggests
that business cycles and long-term growth rates are determined jointly
by the same economic model. There is evidence that characteristics of
the business cycle are not independent of the growth process, and the
volatility associated with the business cycle is negatively related to
long-term growth rates.
The paper is organized as follows; Section 1 studies the relation be-
tween the persistence of business cycles and long-term growth. Section 2
explores the links between volatility and growth, and Section 3 concludes.
1. TRENDS, PERSISTENCE, AND GROWTH
The stability of growth rates for the U.S. economy has been used as
an argument for keeping the analysis of trends separate from the analy-
sis of economic fluctuations. However, this apparent stability of U.S
4. See Fatás (2000a, 2000b) for evidence on the effects of business cycles on
R&D expenditures and the link between persistence and growth.
5. My sample of ninety-eight countries is identical to the one used by Bernanke
and Gürkaynak (2002), and it excludes formerly planned economies. See the
appendix for a detailed description of the data.194 Antonio Fatás
growth rates is at odds with the econometric analysis of its time series
properties, which shows that the log-linear trend is far from being an
accurate representation of its long-term properties. This stylized fact
was brought up by Nelson and Plosser (1982), who question the tradi-
tional method of measuring business cycles as temporary deviations of
output from a deterministic log-linear trend. Their paper triggered a
debate on the persistence of output fluctuations and the existence of a
unit root in GDP. Although some of this debate is still open, one fact is
no longer questioned: output does not show a strong tendency to return
to trend after being hit by a shock. Consequently, growth and business
cycles cannot be separated analytically, which raises the need for mod-
els in which the stochastic properties of the trend are somehow related
to the business cycle itself.
This evidence was initially used to promote the real business cycle
theory, in which the persistence of business cycles is interpreted as a
sign of the nature of the disturbances that causes business cycles (tech-
nological events). While this approach incorporates growth and fluctua-
tions into a single model, however, there is still a sense in which growth
is left out of the analysis, given that long-term growth rates are deter-
mined by the exogenous growth rate of technological progress in a Solow-
type model.6
An alternative explanation to the high persistence of business cycle
fluctuations comes from models that consider growth dynamics to be
central to the properties of the business cycle. Within the framework of
endogenous growth models, King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and Stadler
(1990) notice that many types of disturbances other than permanent
shifts in the production function can produce persistent fluctuations.
The intuition is simple: any temporary disturbance that has an effect
on the amount of resources allocated to growth can produce permanent
effects on the level of output. In other words, if investment in growth-
enhancing projects is diminished during recessions and the recovery is
not strong enough to catch up with lost time, then output will not re-
turn to its trend. Recessions can thus have costs that go well beyond the
added volatility to the economy.
The task of distinguishing these two explanations empirically is a
difficult one. Two approaches have been followed. One is to compare the
relative ability of both types of models to match features of the business
cycle. This is the approach taken by Jones, Manuelli, and Siu (2000).
Their conclusions are in some cases supportive of endogenous growth
6. See, for example, Kydland and Prescott (1982); King and others (1991).195 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
models, but they encounter many difficulties discriminating between
the two types of models. An alternative methodology is to look for em-
pirical connections between the degree of persistence of business cycles
and long-term growth rates. This is only interesting if there are sig-
nificant differences in persistence across countries. Cogley (1990) stud-
ies the variability of the low-frequency component of output in a sample
of nine countries; he shows that there are significant differences among
them, with the United States having the most stable low-frequency
component of the sample. If this degree of persistence is related to the
long-term growth rates of these countries, then it would establish a
direct connection between long-term growth rates and a feature of eco-
nomic fluctuations intrinsically linked to the question of whether busi-
ness cycles have long-term consequences beyond uncertainty and short-
term volatility.
A reduced-form version of a model that displays endogenous growth
can be used to illustrate the link between persistence and growth.7
Assume that the economy is characterized by a production function of
the type
a = tttt YALK,  (1)
where Y is output, L is labor, A is a technological parameter, and K is
the economy’s stock of knowledge; for simplicity, the stock of knowl-
edge is assumed to affect all firms equally, and no firm is large enough
to internalize the effects of its actions on this stock. Knowledge is accu-















where g represents the degree of learning in the economy.8
7. See Fatás (2000b) for a complete optimizing model that leads to dynamics
identical to those of this reduced form model.
8. This production function, together with the learning process, implies very
strong scale effects. These scale effects are not necessary for any of the intuitions
developed with this simple model, and a model without scale effects can display
similar dynamics. I use such a simplistic production function and learning process
to make the resolution of the model as simple as possible and to provide the
clearest possible presentation of the intuition. See Fatás (2000b) for a detailed
discussion of these arguments.196 Antonio Fatás
The growth rate of output at any point in time is equal to
( ) ( ) -- Øø D=--g+a--g ºß 11 11 ttttt yaall ,  (3)
where lowercase letters denote natural logarithms. I assume that at is
a stationary process and that the labor supply function is such that
labor is also stationary. Let a* and l* be the steady-state values of labor
and productivity. In the absence of any cyclical disturbance, the economy
will grow at a rate equal to
** D=g+ag t yal .  (4)
I now introduce cyclical shocks by postulating a stochastic process
for the technology parameter at. Assume that it follows an AR(1) pro-
cess such that
- =r+m 1 ttt aa . (5)
Under the assumption that labor supply is inelastic, output growth
can be expressed as a function of m.
( ) ( ) Øø D=--gm ºß 11 tt yLCL , (6)
where L is the lag operator and C(L) is the Wold representation of the
AR(1) process for at, such that
( ) =+r+r+r+ K
2233 1 CLLLL  (7)
From equation 6, it is clear that cyclical fluctuations have long-
lasting effects on output despite their transitory nature, because of the
effects on the accumulation of knowledge. One way to look at these
long-lasting effects is to measure the change in the long-term forecasts
of output when there is a shock to at. The solution is simply the sum of
the coefficients from equation 6 for Dyt, above.
( ) D=m tt yDL ,  (8)
where D(L) = d0 + d1L + d2L2 + d3L3 + … is a lag polynomial. Then,
the coefficients dj measure the impact of a shock mt on the growth rate197 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
of output in period t + j. Adding up these coefficients yields the long-












represents the impact of a shock mt on the level of output at t + J. The
infinite sum of all dj coefficients measures the permanent impact of a
given shock on the output level, let P be this sum, such that
( ) lim1.
J
J PPD ﬁ¥ ==  (10)
In the model, the sum of these coefficients is equal to
( ) ( ) ( ) ØøØø Øø =+r--g+r-r-g+r-r-g+ ºß ºßºß K
232 1111 P ,  (11)







This expression is intuitive: the long-term effects of business
cycles are an increasing function of the persistence of the shocks
themselves and the parameter g, which represents the speed at which
knowledge accumulates through learning by doing. What is impor-
tant for my argument is that long-term persistence becomes a mea-
sure of the long-term costs of recessions, and the origin of these
costs are the effects that recessions have on the accumulation of
knowledge (the driving force behind long-term growth). In this styl-
ized model, output always returns to its log-linear trend in the ab-
sence of long-term growth (g = 0).
The above model produces a simple, intuitive explanation sug-
gesting that business cycles have permanent effects on output through
the dynamics of the growth process. During recessions, the growth
process slows down. Recoveries bring the growth rate back to nor-
mal, but the level remains below the log-linear trend followed before
the recession. Countries with larger growth rates have more to lose198 Antonio Fatás
during recessions than countries with lower rates, and they therefore
display larger permanent effects of business cycles. As a result, fast-
growing countries display more volatile trends.9
The relationship described above can be used to discriminate
among different theories on growth and business cycles. For example,
in a model in which growth stems from exogenous technological
progress (assume that A grows exogenously at some rate), this mea-
sure of persistence (P) would simply be a function of the parameter r.
The typical formulation of a real business cycle has g = 0 and r = 1,
together with exogenous technological progress for the technological
parameter A. Under these circumstances, persistence would be inde-
pendent of growth and P = 1 .
Is there any empirical evidence that persistence and growth rates
are correlated? The answer is yes. Using a sample of about a hundred
countries from the Summers-Heston dataset, I calculate the degree of
persistence of annual fluctuations to determine whether this degree
of persistence is correlated to the countries’ long-term growth rates.
Persistence is calculated using two different methods. First, I esti-
mate an AR(1) process for GDP growth and approximate P by invert-
ing the lag polynomial associated with the AR(1) process. Second, I
use Cochrane’s variance ratio, which has often been used to estimate


















JyyJ ,  (13)
where rj is the jth autocorrelation of the growth rate of output. Taking




J VV .  (14)
9. A set of papers postulate that recessions can have the opposite effect (that
is, be beneficial for growth). Caballero and Hammour (1994), Galí and Hammour
(1991), and Hall (1991) all present models in which recessions lead to permanent
improvements in productivity because research activities offer a higher return
than production activities during such periods or because recessions lead to the
destruction of the least productive firms.
10. See Cochrane (1988) for a description of this series.199 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
Both V and P take the value 0 for a trend-stationary series and the











For the model above, this expression is equal to
( )










This expression is always increasing in g as long as g < 2, a condi-
tion that is required for output growth to be a stationary series. In
other words, fast-growing countries display a larger degree of persis-
tence as measured by either of the two indicators (P or V).
Table 1 presents the results of regressing the degree of persistence
of annual fluctuations on the long-term growth rate of output for both
the full sample (ninety-eight countries) and the restricted sample of
member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).11 This procedure is carried out for the two pro-
posed measures of persistence and using per capita GDP as measures
of economic activity. In the case of the variance ratio, I choose a win-
dow of five years (that is, including correlations of GDP growth with its
first four lags).
In all cases, the coefficient is positive and significant. In the case of
the OECD economies, the fit of the regression and the size of the coeffi-
11. See the appendix for a detailed description of the countries included.
Table 1. Persistence and Growtha
Explanatory variable P V
5
Sample All OECD All OECD
b 0.066 0.383 0.090 0.611
 (0.029) (0.137) (0.043) (0.102)
Summary statistics
R2 0.09 0.53 0.07 0.62
a. Persistence i = a + b Avg.Growthi + hi. Sample: 1950–1998. Robust standard errors in parentheses.200 Antonio Fatás
cient are larger than in the overall sample.12 These differences can
partially be attributed to the different nature of the business cycle across
countries. OECD economies generally exhibit well-defined business
cycles, so the measure of persistence is appropriate for them. Some of
the other countries, however, experience less regular, less uniform booms
and recessions; a symmetric measure of persistence like the one used
in table 1 can be much noisier in these cases than among the OECD
countries. This reasoning explains the larger standard errors in the
full sample. The fact that the coefficient is low has no straightforward
explanation. A formal test could not reject the hypothesis that they are
equal, and the two coefficients become closer in size if one corrects for
outliers. However, whether these effects are of greater economic impor-
tance for OECD countries remains an open question.13
The results of table 1 show strong support for the idea that growth
and business cycles are not independent phenomena. Persistence, which
serves as a measure of the long-term effects of business cycles, is posi-
tively correlated to growth. Explaining the estimates of table 1 one re-
quires a theory in which growth and fluctuations are jointly determined.
One has to be careful in interpreting the results of table 1 in terms of
the effects of volatility on growth. The results suggest that growth dy-
namics play a role in shaping business cycles, but the argument could be
entirely symmetric. The discussion on recessions (negative shocks) also
applies to booms (positive shocks). Thus while fast-growing countries
feel the effects of recessions more than slow-growing counties, they also
benefit more from positive shocks. In that sense, the correlation between
persistence and growth, although encouraging, does not provide a direct
link between the volatility of fluctuations and average growth. Given
enough symmetry, more fluctuations lead to more volatile trends, but
the average growth rate remains constant. The next section explores
theories and empirical evidence that go beyond this first relationship
between growth and business cycles. By introducing asymmetries and
by taking into consideration the direct role that volatility and uncer-
tainty can play in determining growth rates, the analysis establishes a
link between volatility and average growth rates.
12. These results are also confirmed when using quarterly data; see Fatás
(2000b).
13. If the regressions from Table 1 are estimated by a robust minimum abso-
lute deviation technique to check for the possibility that outliers, the estimates for
the full sample and the OECD sample are closer. It is also interesting to point out
that with this estimation technique, the significance of the coefficient increases
for both samples confirming that outliers are not driving our main result.201 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
2. BUSINESS CYCLES, UNCERTAINTY, AND GROWTH
Do business cycles affect long-term performance? Is volatility bad
for growth? The evidence presented thus far cannot answer these ques-
tions. In models of the type above, an increase in uncertainty—that is,
an increase in the volatility of the disturbance m—has no effect on long-
term growth rates. Average growth is not affected by business cycles.
There are two ways of modifying the analysis so that volatility
and uncertainty become relevant for long-term growth. The first is
very mechanical and consists of thinking about fluctuations as being
asymmetric. What if more fluctuations meant deeper recessions rela-
tive to unchanged expansions? Rodrik (1991), for example, considers
the case of policy reform and the uncertainty introduced by the possi-
bility that reform is reversed. In his model, additional uncertainty
not only increases risk, but also lowers the average return to invest-
ment, because it is assumed that no reform leads to larger distor-
tions.14 Another example is the analysis of political uncertainty. Po-
litical uncertainty is usually measured by variables such as the num-
ber of revolutions and military coups or the number of political assas-
sinations. An increase in both of these variables does not simply rep-
resent more volatility around a constant mean, but rather indicates
more volatility and a lower mean. Introducing this type of asymmet-
ric fluctuation into an endogenous growth model can lead to a straight-
forward connection between fluctuations and growth. For example,
introducing asymmetric fluctuations in the disturbance m in the model
from the previous section establishes a direct relationship between
average technology and its volatility and, therefore, the average growth
rate of output. More volatile economies would display a lower mean
for the technology parameter, A, than would less volatile economies,
and they would grow at a lower rate as a result. Another possible
source of asymmetry is the accumulation process. What if the nega-
tive effects of recessions on learning by doing are stronger than the
positive effects of booms? This is the spirit of the model developed by
Martin and Rogers (1997). In this case, there is also a negative rela-
tionship between volatility and growth.
The second way to link business cycles and growth is to introduce
risk aversion or irreversibilities to investment. In this case, even if
disturbances and business cycles are held symmetric, uncertainty can
14. Hausmann and Gavin (1996) make a similar argument to explain the poor
growth performance of Latin American countries.202 Antonio Fatás
also directly affect growth.15 For example, Feeney (1999) argues that
risk sharing (through trade) and the associated decrease in uncertainty
and volatility can have positive effects on growth. An endogenous growth
model can also introduce general equilibrium effects of uncertainty on
growth through consumer’s behavior and the labor supply, as in Jones,
Manuelli, and Stachetti (1999) or de Hek and Roy (2001).
In the sample of countries considered here, what are the main
sources of uncertainty and volatility that make business cycles so dif-
ferent across countries? One possibility involves differences in economic
policies. Talvi and Végh (2000) and Fatás and Mihov (2002) present
evidence of differences in fiscal policy behavior across countries and
examine how these differences are associated with different political
institutions or economic structures. A second candidate is terms-of-
trade shocks and the economy’s degree of openness, as argued by Rodrik
(1998). A third possibility is that the development of financial markets
is strongly correlated with the shape of business cycles. Well-function-
ing financial markets can provide the tools for smoothing business cycles.
In the absence of these tools, countries are more likely to suffer exces-
sive volatility (see, for example, Caballero, 2000).
Several papers analyze the relationship between volatility and
growth from an empirical standpoint. The first group of papers looks
directly at the relationship between volatility and growth without
focusing on a specific channel through which the effects take place.
This group includes Ramey and Ramey (1995), Kormendi and Meguire
(1985), and Martin and Rogers (2000). A second strand of the litera-
ture explores specific sources of uncertainty and how this uncer-
tainty has affected long-term growth. For example, Alesina and oth-
ers (1996) study the effects of political instability on growth, while
Judson and Orphanides (1999) analyze the effects of the volatility of
inflation on growth. Most of these papers present evidence in favor
of the hypothesis that volatility, uncertainty, or political instability
hurts growth. I now review some of this evidence, presenting addi-
tional tests of the robustness of the relationship between volatility
and growth and also investigating some of the specific channels
through which the relationship takes place.
I start by measuring the volatility of the business cycle by the stan-
dard deviation of per capita GDP growth rates. Table 2 displays the
results of a regression of average growth rates (1950–1998) on business
cycle volatility for all the countries in the sample. The coefficient is
15. Bernanke (1983); Bertola and Caballero (1994).203 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
positive and significant. Conditioning the correlation to the logarithm
of 1960 per capita GDP does not alter the size of the coefficient,
although its significance falls.16 In terms of the size of the coefficient, a
one standard deviation increase in volatility (about 2.3 percent) leads
to a decrease in the growth rate of per capita GDP of about 0.4 percent,
a relatively large effect.
2.1 Volatility versus Uncertainty
Table 2 measures business cycle volatility as the standard devia-
tion of per capita GDP growth rates. This measure includes variations
in GDP that can be forecast by economic agents. If what really matters
for growth is uncertainty, then the residuals of a forecasting equation
for output growth might provide a key indicator. For each of the coun-
tries in the sample, I regress output growth on its own lagged value, as
well as on a linear and a quadratic trend. Introducing these trends
serves to remove low-frequency movements in output that log-linear
detrending cannot address.17 The results are practically identical, both
in terms of the size of the coefficient and the fit of the regression (see
table 3). Because of the similarity of the results, the rest of the paper
uses the standard deviation of per capita output growth rates to mea-
sure volatility.
16. Although the data starts for some countries in 1950, we always choose
1960 as the ‘initial’ year in order to keep consistency across countries. Using 1950
for those countries for which data is available does not change any of the results
presented in the paper.
17. These low frequency movements could bias some of our results because
they could be measured as volatility of output growth when they are simply changes
in average growth rates over time.
Table 2. Business Cycle Volatility and Growtha
Explanatory variable (1) (2)
Volatility –0.241 –0.179
(0.075) (0.090)




a. Growthi = a + b Volatilityi + d Xi + hi. Sample: 1950–1998. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses.204 Antonio Fatás
2.2 Volatility versus Bad Policies
The biggest concern with the negative correlation between growth
and business cycles found in tables 2 and 3 is the possibility that a third
variable (or group of variables) is correlated with both of them and is
ultimately responsible for this correlation. The first candidate is so-called
bad economic policy. Governments with policies that are unfriendly to
growth can introduce additional sources of volatility in the economy. It
might also be the case that bad economic policies are generally more
volatile policies, leading to more pronounced business cycles. If so, more
volatile policies might be correlated with lower growth, while the true
cause of lower growth is the low average quality of the policies.18
Empirically assessing whether volatility is acting as a proxy for
bad policies in the regressions of tables 1 and 2 requires identifying
variables that can serve as direct measures of policies that hurt growth
and are correlated with the volatility of the business cycle. For ex-
ample, the degree of openness is known to be correlated with long-term
growth, and it is also related to the general degree of uncertainty faced
by an economy.19 Government size, which is a relevant variable in
many growth models, is also related to the volatility of business cycles.
Finally, inflation or inflation variability are key variables in business
cycles and have been shown to have an effect on growth.
Table 4 presents the results of introducing these four variables
into the analysis. Once again, the size of the coefficient is practically
Table 3. Uncertainty and Growtha
Explanatory variable (1) (2)
Uncertainty –0.247 –0.187
(0.077) (0.093)




a. Growthi = a + b Uncertaintyi + d Xi + hi. Sample: 1950–1998. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
18. As discussed before, in the analysis of policy reform in developing coun-
tries in Rodrik (1991), a higher probability of failure of reform is associated both to
worse economic policy (higher distortions) and more uncertainty.
19. See Rodrik (1998).205 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
unchanged from the previous table. Although this is only a partial
list of variables capturing policy effects, I conclude that in the re-
gressions, business cycle volatility is not capturing differences in
economic policies, at least not in those related to inflation, openness,
or government size.
2.3 Specific Sources of Business Cycle Volatility
The previous tables measured volatility by the standard deviation
of output growth. What are the main variables that determine this
volatility? Do all of them have the same effect? Answering these ques-
tions can be useful for two reasons. First, it can help discriminate
among different theories by providing a more precise measure of the
cause of the volatility that affects long-term growth rates. Second, it
can be used in the main regression to avoid biases associated with
endogeneity or omitted variables. The idea is to introduce variables
that are clearly related to economic policy and the business cycle but
that, in principle, should not be directly related to long-term growth
rates. I look at variables that are normally considered to be neutral in
the long run, starting with a set of variables that are associated with
monetary policy. These include average inflation, the volatility of detrended
money balances, and a measure of the exchange rate arrangement of
















a. Growthi = a + b Volatilityi + d Xi + hi. Sample: 1950–1998. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.206 Antonio Fatás
each country.20 I also include a measure of the volatility of fiscal policy:
the residual of a forecasting regression of the budget deficit that in-
cludes output growth as well as a linear and a quadratic trend. My
empirical strategy is first to see whether these variables are correlated
with the measure of business cycle volatility and then to use this corre-
lation to refine the estimates of the effects of volatility on growth.
A regression of output volatility on these four variables produces
coefficients of the sign that would be expected (see table 5). Countries
with fixed exchange rates, a higher inflation rate, more uncertain mon-
etary policy, and more volatile fiscal policy have a more pronounced
business cycle.
The information contained in table 5 can be used to reproduce the
estimates of tables 2, 3, and 4, using these four variables as instru-
ments of the volatility of the business cycle. Results are presented in
table 6. The effect of volatility on growth is still significant, and the
coefficient is larger in magnitude compared with the results of the ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) regressions.
I do not claim that these variables are, under all theories, exog-
enous to economic growth or unrelated to all possible omitted variables
that directly influence economic growth.21 Rather, the results of table
6 confirm the negative relationship between growth and business cycles
20. Including the volatility of inflation rates does not add much to the analysis
as it is highly correlated with the average inflation rate.
21. For example, and as argued before, inflation rates or the volatility of
monetary and fiscal policy can be related to overall ‘bad economic policy’ that leads
to lower economic growth.
Table 5. Business Cycle Volatility and Economic Policya
Explanatory variable (1)
Exchange rate flexibility –0.901
(0.401)
Volatility in monetary policy 0.132
(0.053)






a. Volatilityi = a + d Xi + hi. Sample: 1950–1998. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.207 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
when the volatility of economic fluctuations is measured using a set of
variables that originate in monetary and fiscal policies generally be-
lieved to be neutral to economic growth beyond their impact on eco-
nomic fluctuations.
2.4 Cross-Country Variation
The effects of volatility on growth should differ among countries.
The development of financial markets, the degree of openness, and the
level of development can condition the negative effects of uncertainty
on investment and growth. This section explores this issue by incorpo-
rating interaction terms between the volatility of output and per capita
GDP, together with a measure of financial development (the average
ratio of M3 to GDP). Table 7 shows the results of introducing these two
interaction terms in the main regression.
In both cases, the interaction terms are significant, suggesting that
the effects are larger for poor countries and countries with relatively less
developed financial markets. This is true regardless of whether in the
regression we condition for initial per capita GDP. Moreover, both the fit
of the regression and the significance of the coefficient on volatility im-
prove considerably. Of the two interaction terms introduced, the one
with per capita GDP achieves a higher significance when both variables
are introduced in the regression (see columns 3 and 6). From an eco-
nomic viewpoint, both interaction variables are large in size. For ex-
ample, large differences are found on analyzing the individual regres-
sions (such as columns 1 and 2) and measuring the effect of volatility on
output for the countries with the highest and lowest levels of develop-
ment or financial deepening. Using the estimates of column 5, the (net)
coefficient on volatility for the country with the average level of finan-
cial development is about –0.25, which is practically identical to the
Table 6. Growth and Business Cycle Volatility, with
Economic Policy Variablesa
Explanatory variable (1) (2)
Volatility –0.483 –0.453
(0.163) (0.189)
Per capita GDP in 1960 (log) –0.073
(0.243)
a. Growthi = a + b Volatilityi + d Xi + hi. Sample: 1950–1998. Robust
standard errors in parentheses208 Antonio Fatás
coefficient estimated in table 2 (with no interaction terms). The same
calculation for the country with the lowest level of financial development
produces a larger coefficient (in absolute value) of about –0.361. The
coefficient turns positive for the country with the highest level of devel-
opment, at about 0.10. In other words, for high levels of development
(measured by per capita GDP or financial deepening), the relationship
between growth and business cycles turns positive instead of negative.
I can only speculate about the reason for this effect. One possibility is
that business cycles differ in nature significantly depending on the level of
development. Another possibility is that fluctuations and uncertainty only
result in lower growth when financial markets are not fully developed and
cannot provide risk-sharing mechanisms to protect agents against uncer-
tainty. Theories that predict a positive correlation between growth and
volatility probably fit rich countries better than poor countries. These theo-
ries suggest that countries choose from a set of technologies characterized
by different combinations of risk and returns (growth). Countries that opt
for riskier technologies will display both more pronounced business cycles
and faster growth. This process, however, requires very well developed
financial markets that can channel funds to those risky projects.
2.5 Effects of Business Cycles on Investment
In looking for a mechanism that explains the observed correlation
between growth rates and business cycle volatility, the obvious candi-
date is investment. Uncertainty can adversely affect investment, and
Table 7. Growth and Business Cycle Volatility: Cross-country
Variationa
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Volatility –1.583 –0.418 –1.329 –3.311 –0.411 –3.100
(0.278) (0.072) (0.298) (0.436) (0.099) (0.514)
Volatility* 0.190 0.146 0.399 0.363
per capita GDP (0.040) (0.047) (0.055) (0.066)
Volatility* 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002
financial development (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Per capita GDP in 1960 (log) –1.511 0.009 –1.488
(0.280) (0.179) (0.321)
Summary statistics
R2 0.37 0.21 0.32 0.53 0.20 0.50
a. Growthi = a + b Volatilityi + d Xi + hi. Sample: 1950–1998. Robust standard errors in parentheses.209 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
investment is one of the most robust variables for explaining long-term
growth rates. Ramey and Ramey (1995) find that the link between in-
vestment and business cycle volatility is less robust than that between
growth and business cycles. Aizenman and Marion (1999), however,
find that the link between investment and volatility is stronger if one
includes only private investment. Table 8 replicates these regressions
for the dataset; it indicates that business cycle volatility is negatively
correlated with average investment rates (see column 1, which reports
the results of a regression run with only volatility on the right-hand
side). A 1 percent increase in volatility reduces the average investment
rate by about 0.5 percentage points. A quick, back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lation suggests that this drop in investment can justify lower growth
rates of about 0.07 percent. This is about one-third of the effect estimated
when average growth rates are regressed on volatility. According to these
numbers, therefore, at most one-third of the effect of volatility on output
growth can be attributed to its effect on lower investment.
Not only is the estimate of the effects of volatility on investment
small, but it is not robust to the introduction of the initial level of GDP,
as shown in column 2. This result can be overturned by allowing for
the effect of volatility on growth rates to depend on the level of per
capita GDP. In this case, the coefficient remains significant (see col-
umn 3). This last result suggests that taking into account the possibil-
ity that the relationship between volatility and growth is a function of
the level of development greatly improves the fit of these regressions.
Simple calculations using the range of values of the interaction term
suggest that the coefficient of volatility on growth is about –3 for the
poorest countries in the sample and about 1 for the richest countries.
Table 8. Investment and Business Cycle Volatilitya
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3)
Volatility –1.106 –0.244 –8.42
(0.363) (0.361) (3.226)
Per capita GDP in 1960 (log) 5.227 0.33
(0.861) (1.778)
Volatility* 1.043
per capita GDP (0.418)
Summary statistics
R2 0.11 0.33 0.43
a. Investmenti = a + b Volatilityi + d Xi + hi. Sample: 1950–1998. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.210 Antonio Fatás
It thus seems that although business cycle volatility has negative
effects on investment, investment cannot be the only channel through
which uncertainty and volatility affect growth. Even in the best sce-
nario, this channel can only account for about one-third of the total
effect. This interpretation seems to corroborate the results of Easterly
and Levine (2001), who argue that factor accumulation cannot explain
most of the cross-country variation on growth rates.
2.6 Robustness of the Correlation to Other Growth-
Related Variables
All the previous tables indicate that volatility matters for growth.
More volatile economies tend to display lower long-term growth rates. In
this section, I run a series of regressions to see whether this relationship
between volatility and growth is robust to the introduction of a series of
variables that have been shown to be relevant for growth. Most of the
variables introduced are supposed to be independent of the volatility of
business cycles, and there is no prior indication of the direction in which
they might affect the results. This exercise follows the methodology of
Levine and Renelt (1992) in testing the robustness of different sets of
variables explaining cross-country differences in growth rates.
The set of variables added to the main regression is that identified
by Levine and Renelt (1992). I include a measure of initial human
capital (secondary education), the average investment rate, and the
Table 9. Growth and Business Cycle Volatility: Robutness
Testsa
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Volatility –0.145 –0.142 –0.110 –0.081
(0.103) (0.059) (0.096) (0.071)
Per capita GDP 0.016 –0.437 –0.102 –0.753
(0.227) (0.207) (0.213) (0.271)




Population Growth –0.679 –0.413
(0.229) (0.204)
Summary statistics
R2 0.15 0.53 0.21 0.54
a. Growthi = a + b Volatilityi + d Xi + hi. Sample: 1950–1998. Robust standard errors in parentheses.211 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
growth rate of the population. Table 9 presents the results of including
one variable at a time, as well as all variables together. All regressions
also include the 1960 level of per capita GDP. The four columns reveal
that the relationship between volatility and growth becomes weaker
as these controls are added. The coefficient is still always negative,
but its size goes down by almost half and its significance falls below
standard levels.22
These results cast doubt on the robustness of the relationship be-
tween volatility and growth, but they offer no hint on the economic mecha-
nism that lies behind the estimates. It is unclear why a variable such as
average population growth would be related to business cycle volatility
in a way that breaks down the relationship between volatility and growth.
To examine these robustness tests more carefully, I again allow
an interaction term between volatility and the level of development.
Table 10 summarizes the results of a regression identical to that in
table 9, but with a new variable that captures the interaction between
Table 10. Volatility and Growth: Interaction between
Business Cycles and Level of Development a
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3)
Volatility –2.772 –1.7 –0.27
(0.282) (0.645) (0.091)
Per capita GDP in 1960 (log) –2.229 –1.856 –0.953
(0.235) (0.422) (0.220)
Secondary education in 1960 0.037 0.04 0.026
(0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
Investment 0.083 0.143 0.12
(0.013) (0.021) (0.024)
Population Growth –0.624 –0.562 –0.465
(0.153) (0.205) (0.465)
Volatility * 0.34
Per capita GDP (0.036)
Volatility * 0.212




R2 0.77 0.58 0.57
a. Growthi = a + b Volatilityi + d Xi + hi. Sample: 1950–1998. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
22. Similar results are obtained if one uses uncertainty, measured by the
residual of a forecasting regression for output growth, instead of volatility.212 Antonio Fatás
business cycles and the level of development. Three variables represent
possible sources of interaction with volatility: average (log) per capita
GDP (column 1), initial (log) per capita GDP (column 2), and the aver-
age ratio of M3 to GDP (column 3).
All three columns produce consistent and interesting results. First,
all the variables are significant and have the correct sign. Second,
and most important, the introduction of an interaction term drasti-
cally increases the significance of the estimate of volatility on growth.
This estimate appears much more robust than in table 9. The inter-
action term is positive in all cases, which confirms my previous esti-
mates and suggests that the negative effects of business cycles on
growth are much larger for poor countries. My main result is thus
robust to the introduction of growth-related variables as long as I
allow for differences across poor and rich countries in the effects of
volatility on growth.
Table 10 can also be used to provide a reading on the significance of
these interaction terms in relation to the ability of poor economies to
converge to the levels of development of rich countries. The table sug-
gests that the speed of convergence is a function of the volatility of
business cycles. For countries with very volatile business cycles, lower
per capita GDP does not ensure convergence toward richer economies.
Taken in conjunction with theories postulating that poor economies
are more likely to be subject to political and economic uncertainty, this
finding points to the possibility that countries will fall into growth traps.
Uncertain environments in poor countries prevent growth from taking
off, and this lack of growth creates the conditions for uncertainty and
economic volatility.
2.7 The Importance of Asymmetries in the Business
Cycle
The analysis thus far indicates that economic fluctuations are nega-
tively related to growth, but the question remains whether other fea-
tures of the business cycle can influence the relationship between the
two variables. The obvious candidate is the asymmetry of business cycles.
In fact, the paper has frequently referred to the possibility that asym-
metric business cycles are responsible for the observed link between
volatility and growth. A proper characterization of business cycle asym-
metries in a sample of ninety-eight countries is beyond the scope of this
paper, but I want to see whether simple statistics that capture the
asymmetric nature of shocks can modify or explain the main results.213 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
I calculated the skewness of per capita GDP growth rates for
each country in the sample and then used this measure of asymme-
try as an explanatory variable in the basic growth regression. Table
11 shows the results of regressing average growth rates on skew-
ness and on skewness and volatility. The coefficient on skewness
has the right sign, indicating that average growth is lower when
business cycles are skewed toward large negative shocks.23 The co-
efficient is not significant, however, and both the coefficient and the
significance drop even further when the measure of volatility is in-
troduced into the regression. I therefore conclude that business cycles
that are skewed to the left (that is, when countries suffer large,
infrequent negative shocks) are more harmful to growth than sym-
metric fluctuations. However, the effect is weak and the coefficient
is not significant, especially after introducing the volatility of busi-
ness cycles into the regression.
Although the results of table 11 seem to question the economic im-
portance of asymmetries in the link between business cycle and growth,
it is important to take into account the difficulties of consistently char-
acterizing asymmetries for the sample of countries under study. The
type of asymmetries captured in the theoretical framework of Rodrik
(1991), for example, is poorly captured by an indicator such as the skew-
ness of the distribution.24
23. See Hausmann and Gavin (1996) for similar arguments in the case of
Latin America.
24. One possible solution to this measurement problem is to look at a specific
source of economic fluctuations (such as oil shocks) and characterize asymme-
tries by looking at the response to both positive and negative shocks to that
variable. Even so, there is a question on whether those shocks have the same
impact in economies at different stages of development.
Table 11. Growth and Business Cycles Asymmetriesa
Explanatory variable (1) (2)






a. Growthi = a + b Skewnessi + Volatilityi + hi. Sample: 1950–1998. Robust
standard errors in parentheses
b. Measured as the skewness of per capita GDP growth rates.214 Antonio Fatás
3. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the link between business cycles and long-term
growth rates. Business cycles and growth are generally analyzed sepa-
rately under the assumption that business cycles can be characterized
by transitory dynamics that have no effect on long-term trends. The
stability of growth rates over the last hundred years in the United
States and other industrial economies, combined with the good fit that
Solow-type growth models produce in cross-country studies, has been
used as a strong empirical argument for keeping economic fluctuations
out of growth models and restricting the study of business cycles to
deviations around the steady state.
The empirical evidence presented here has uncovered interesting
interactions between cycles and growth that are significant both eco-
nomically and statistically. My argument is based on two related pieces
of evidence. First, business cycles cannot be considered temporary de-
viations from a trend. This observation, which is largely studied in the
literature that looks at the trend-cycle decomposition, is instrumental
for understanding the effects of volatility on growth. Under the inter-
pretation presented in this paper, the documented persistence of busi-
ness cycles is a measure of the effects of business cycles on growth. The
fact that there is a strong positive correlation between persistence of
short-term fluctuations and long-term growth rates contradicts busi-
ness cycle models based on small deviations from a steady-state solu-
tion in a Solow-type growth model. This paper shows that a simple
endogenous growth model in which business cycles affect growth can
easily replicate this correlation.
Second, in models featuring asymmetric business cycles, an in-
crease in volatility can lead to a decrease in long-term growth rates.
Even without asymmetries, uncertainty related to business cycle vola-
tility can lead to lower growth. The data support this proposition. Coun-
tries with more volatile fluctuations display lower long-term growth
rates. A series of robustness tests designed to correct for possible omit-
ted variables bias or problems of endogeneity reveals that the relation-
ship is robust. Additional evidence points to a nonlinear relationship
between growth and business cycles, which is well captured by an in-
teraction term between volatility and the level of development. The
effect of business cycles on growth is much larger for poor countries.
This finding holds true if the level of development is measured by the
degree of financial deepening. A plausible interpretation of this effect is
that the development of financial markets reduces the costs associated215 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
with volatility and uncertainty because it opens possibilities for risk
sharing among individuals.
Although the results clearly support models that integrate busi-
ness cycles and long-term growth, the process of extracting policy rec-
ommendations from them is inherently difficult. The lack of an ac-
cepted theoretical framework limits the ability to produce structural
tests of well-specified theories. So far, endogenous growth models have
had only limited success explaining cross-country growth patterns. The
results of this paper encourage further theoretical development of en-
dogenous growth models with business cycles. They also suggest that
making explicit the effects of economic fluctuations on growth could
improve the models’ ability to explain features of the business cycle.APPENDIX
List of Countries
Algeria Ecuador Malawi Singapore
Angola Egypt Malaysia Somalia
Argentina El Salvador Mali South Africa
Australia Ethiopia Mauritania Spain
Austria Finland Mauritius Sri Lanka
Bangladesh France Mexico Sudan
Belgium Germany Morocco Sweden
Benin Ghana Mozambique Switzerland
Bolivia Greece Nepal Syria
Botswana Guatemala Netherlands Tanzania
Brazil Haiti New Zealand Thailand
Burkina Faso Honduras Nicaragua Togo
Burma Hong Kong Niger Trinidad and Tobago
Burundi India Nigeria Tunisia
Cameroon Indonesia Norway Turkey
Canada Ireland Pakistan Uganda
Central African Rep. Israel Panama United Kingdom
Colombia Italy Papua New Guinea United States
Congo Jamaica Paraguay Uruguay
Costa Rica Japan Peru Venezuela
Cote d’Ivoire Jordan Philippines Zaire
Chad Kenya Portugal Zambia
Chile Korea, Republic of Rwanda Zimbabwe
Denmark Liberia Senegal
Dominican Republic Madagascar Sierra Leone
Source of variables:
GDP, population, and investment rates are from the Summers-Heston Penn World Tables, version 6.0 (available
at www.princeton.edu/~gurkaynk/growthdata.html).
Inflation, money supply (M3), openness, government size, and budget deficit are from the World Bank, World
Development Indicators, 2001.
Exchange rate arrangements are from the International Monetary Fund, “Annual Report on Exchange Arrange-
ments and Exchange Restrictions,” several years. Original coefficients (from 1 to 10) have been transformed to
a scale of 1 to 3, where 1 represents fixed, 2 intermediate, and 3 flexible exchange rates. Fixed exchange rates
correspond to the original values of 1 to 5, intermediate to the values of 6 to 8, and flexible to the values 9 and 10.217 The Effects of Business Cycles on Growth
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